Subject:
Implications of government proposals to
accelerate land reform.
Significance: The redistribution
of land is opposed by the anti-government
movement, which sees the programme as
a 'communisation' of Venezuela.
Analysis: "Immediately after
securing victory in the August 15 recall
referendum, President Hugo Chávez
called for application of the 2001 Land
Law to be speeded up. During his 'Alo
Presidente' television programme, Chávez
called on the military, state governors
and local officials to begin identifying
land, which, under the terms of the 2001
legislation, can be redistributed by the
state to homeless families and peasants.
Apart from unused public land, a specific
target for the government is 'latifundia'
holdings. This refers to rural property
of 5,000 hectares or more, which is not
being used for agricultural or other productive
purposes.
Under the terms of the 2001 legislation,
title deeds or other forms of purchase
evidence have to be presented if the land
in question is disputed by private owners.
The government will provide compensation
at the market rate for land that is expropriated.
The legislation also allows the state
to assume control of private landholdings
of as little as 100 hectares, if the land
is prime and not being put to use.
Land
dispute. The Land Law was introduced
in 2001 together with 48 other measures,
which form the government's programme
of change. The introduction of these 49
laws catalysed the initial protests against
Chávez by the opposition (see VENEZUELA:
Strike exposes Chávez's isolation
- December 12, 2001). In terms of the
Land Law, the central contention of the
opposition was that the measure undermined
private property ownership. There were
also concerns that the administration
was seeking to 'Cubanise' Venezuela by
imposing a communist model. This has not
proved to be the case, and there have
been no seizures of privately held land.
However, the opposition has continued
to express hostility to the legislation
and protests can be expected if the acceleration
of the Land Law encroaches on private
property. While there has been no recorded
incidence of 'state' violence, human rights
groups have reported that over 70 peasants
have been killed by paramilitary groups
hired by large landowners.
In 2003, the government distributed 1.5
million hectares of land to 130,000 families
under the 2001 legislation (see VENEZUELA:
Agricultural policies aggravate crisis
- August 7, 2003). The aim of the reform
is to 'democratise' land ownership, which
is the most unequal in Latin America and
the Caribbean. An estimated 60% of prime
agricultural land is controlled by just
1% of proprietors. The sector has traditionally
been protected and highly unproductive,
and, as a result, Venezuela is heavily
dependent on imported agriculture. However,
apart from the social benefits provided
by small-scale land ownership, the extent
to which the current programme will improve
economic and agricultural performance
is open to question:
Although the Land Law is supported by
a number of new institutions, including
the Land Institute and rural credit organisations,
much progress needs to be made in improving
access to agricultural training, capital,
fertiliser, technology and markets before
the sector can make a significant and
sustainable contribution to the country's
economic performance (…)
Poverty politics. The acceleration
of the Land Law runs parallel with a wider
initiative to speed up delivery of welfare
and social programmes to the most marginalised
sectors of the population. In recent days
the administration announced a new housing
programme, which the state oil company
PDVSA will fund (see VENEZUELA: Chávez
win points to oil policy continuity -
August 24, 2004). To date, the government
has built 20,000 new homes, reconstructed
10,000 others and distributed property
titles to 45,000 families. These projects
have served to increase Chávez's
popularity among the poor, and the administration
is keen to consolidate the loyalty of
this sector of the population ahead of
the 2006 presidential election. However,
in seeking to cement support among the
marginalised, the government runs the
risk of further alienating its opponents
at an already tense and difficult time
for the country.
Business dealings. This comes at
a time when the government is also seeking
to encourage dialogue with the opposition,
specifically the business sector. The
finance minister, Tobias Nobrega, has
recently held meetings with representatives
of the Venezuelan-American Chamber (VenAmCham),
during which issues relating to the foreign
exchange and taxation regime were addressed.
However, the leading private sector organisation,
Fedecámaras, has not participated
in any of these initial dialogue meetings,
and the organisation has laid down strict
conditions ahead of any discussions with
the government.
Fedecámaras played a leading role
in the mobilisation of the anti-government
protests in 2001 and the organisation's
then president, Pedro Carmona, temporarily
assumed the presidency when Chávez
was briefly removed during the 2002 coup
attempt (see VENEZUELA: Chávez
returns calling for dialogue - April 15,
2002). Both sides will have to engage
in an intensive process of bridge-building
if their mutual hostilities are to be
overcome, but given the nature of the
terms set out by Fedecámaras, there
appears to be limited room for compromise:
· In a document issued at the beginning
of September, Fedecámaras called
on the government to respect private property,
allow freedom of discussion, democratise
public powers and relaunch the decentralisation
of responsibilities to state governors.
· Fedecámaras has also emphasised
that it still disputes the recall referendum
result, and has called on the government
to recognise the opposition-controlled
Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV)
as the only legitimate representative
of organised labour.
It is extremely unlikely that the administration
will accept any of these demands, the
bulk of which it has already dismissed.
Outlook.
Fedecámaras has placed itself in
a very problematic position and may find
itself marginalised if the dialogue process
between the government and the opposition
continues to gather pace. Moreover, a
majority of Venezuelans, and an estimated
80% of organisations affiliated to Fedecámaras,
want unconditional peace and dialogue.
Given this prevailing sentiment, the administration
is unlikely to make any concessions to
its more radical and demanding opponents,
particularly as the government feels the
referendum process has enhanced its political
authority. At the same time, new claims
by the organisation Sumate that, according
to their analyses, voting machines were
probably tampered with may produce fresh
challenges to the referendum result and
encourage the most hard-line opposition
to maintain their position of rejecting
the result.
Conclusion:
The capacity of Fedecámaras and
the CTV to place themselves again at the
head of mass protests against an acceleration
of the government's programme has waned.
The government's strengthened position
will encourage it to press ahead, although
the land reform in particular may exacerbate
tensions at a time when dialogue is needed
to ameliorate political polarisation".
